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ABSTRACT
Motivated in part by the dramatic changes in the United States economy and public assistance
policies, many researchers have examined the changes in the resources of the low-income population
over the last two decades, with particular attention paid to income from earnings and public
assistance programs.  One source of income that has received comparatively little attention is income
from private transfers.  However, private transfers may be a key source of support for low-income
individuals, especially for those who have had little attachment to the labor force or who have
experienced reductions in public assistance.  In this paper, we provide a conceptual discussion of
private transfers drawing on several related literatures and provide new empirical evidence regarding
the significance of private of transfers as a source income. We find that private transfers are an
important source of income for many less-skilled households, the contribution of private transfers
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1. Introduction 
During the 1990s, the United States economy experienced sustained economic growth with 
low levels of unemployment and high levels of wage growth accruing across the skill 
distribution.  Along with this robust economic performance, there were substantial changes in 
economic and social policies: the minimum wage was raised for the first time in fifteen years, the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was expanded, and cash welfare assistance was changed from 
an entitlement to a temporary assistance program that imposes strict work requirements and 
lifetime limits on benefits.   
Many of these changes would be expected to have had large effects on the incomes of the 
poor, and consequently, there has been a spate of research assessing how the low-income 
population has fared.  Some of these studies have focused on specific changes—such as changes 
in the wage distribution (David Autor, et al., 2004), the Earned Income Tax Credit (Bruce Meyer 
and Daniel Rosenbaum, 1999), and cash welfare assistance (see Rebecca Blank 2002 for a useful 
review)—while others have examined the overall changes in the income of the poor (Blank and 
Robert Schoeni, 2003).  
One source of income that has received comparably little attention is income from private 
transfers.  Private transfers can come from relatives, friends, or non-spousal partners and can 
consist of cash or non-cash transfers or shared living arrangements.
1  We refer to this broad 
definition of private transfers as “resource sharing.” Shared resources could be especially 
important for low-income individuals who may not qualify for benefits from social insurance 
programs such as unemployment insurance or Worker’s Compensation, both of which require 
some degree of previous attachment to the labor force.  Moreover, the recent changes in public 
                                                 
1 Although assistance from charitable institutions may be an important source of support for some low income 
families, we do not address it here.    p. 2 
assistance programs, including time limits on benefit receipt and work requirements, will result 
in a reduction in assistance for some.  Absent these formal sources of support, low-income 
individuals may turn to family or friends. Recent research has indeed provided some evidence 
that resource sharing is an important component of income for individuals leaving the welfare 
rolls (Sheldon Danziger et al., 2002; Robert Moffitt and Katie Winder, 2005). 
In this paper, we consider the importance of resource sharing to the financial well-being of 
low-income households and changes in this importance over time.  We begin in section 2 with a 
broad discussion of resource sharing, drawing on several existing literatures. We consider both 
the potential motivation for sharing and the different modes through which such sharing can 
occur.  Because this volume focuses on the low-income population, we pay specific attention to 
the interaction between private transfers and government assistance programs. 
In Section 3 we undertake an empirical analysis of resource sharing from 1980 to 1979 to 
2003 using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).  Our analysis yields several 
important findings.  First, private cash transfers from outside the household are an important 
source of income for recipients and are more common when the economy is weak. Second, 
although much attention has focused on cash transfers, shared living arrangements provide an 
alternative means of resource sharing that is quite common among the low-income population; 
coresidency thus has the potential to be a significant source of support for the poor.  Third, the 
importance of private cash transfers and income from unrelated household members rose beyond 
that predicted by macroeconomic and demographic changes, suggesting that factors such as 
changes in public programs (e.g., TANF and the EITC) could also be important.     p. 3 
Overall, our analysis, like those on which it builds, is limited by the available data.  In 
section 4, we discuss these limitations and offer suggestions for future research, as well as 
discuss the implications of our findings for public policy. 
2. A synthesis of the related literature 
The recent literature on the well-being of the low-income population has focused on the 
importance of labor market opportunities and public transfer programs. However, both the 
robustness of the labor market faced by less-skilled workers and the regulations governing the 
receipt of public assistance are beyond the control of these individuals. When faced with a 
reduction in income, an individual may look for assistance from private sources, such as family 
and friends. Despite the potential importance of private transfers, relatively little research has 
focused on such assistance.  In this section, we draw on a diverse set of literatures to consider the 
potential importance of private transfers and to lay the ground work for our empirical analyses. 
We take a broad view of private transfers, including both cash and non-cash transfers and 
shared living arrangements. Measurement of these transfers is not always straightforward. For 
example, imbedded in the value of shared living arrangements is the direct transfer of such 
tangible items as food, shelter, and household goods, as well as less readily measurable 
assistance implicit in the returns to scale in household production.
2  We will use the  term 
“transfers” to refer to direct assistance provided through cash or non-cash transfers or through 
shared residence, and reserve the more general concept of “resource sharing” to indicate both 
these direct transfers and the indirect gains obtained through coresidence.  In many cases, we do 
not observe how resources are actually shared among coresident individuals, but rather, we only 
observe the income of each individual. When discussing the phenomenon of how coresident 
                                                 
2 For example, the fixed cost of telephone service is the same regardless of how many individuals share the 
apartment    p. 4 
individuals might combine their incomes, we use the term “income pooling.”  We note also that 
the focus of this paper is on voluntary resource sharing.  We refer the reader to the chapter by 
Maria Cancian and Meyer (2005) for a discussion of legally mandated transfers such as alimony 
and child support.   
2.1. Motives for resource sharing  
A family can provide assistance to one of its members out of concern for the well-being of 
the (potential) recipient (Robert Barro, 1974; Gary Becker, 1974) or as part of a quid pro quo 
arrangement (B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Schleifer and Lawrence Summers, 1985).
3  These 
competing explanations, the former an altruistic motivation and the latter based on exchange, 
have generated a sizable volume of research, with much of it attempting to discern which motive 
is most consistent with the data.
4 Despite these efforts, a consensus has yet to be reached, and 
recent work suggests that each model may play an important role (Audrey Light and Kathleen 
McGarry, 2004).  The existing literature has, however, generally found that transfers are strongly 
compensatory, with both the probability of a transfer and the amount higher for lower income 
recipients (Cox, 1987; Joseph Altonji, Fumio Hayashi, Laurence Kotlikoff, 1997; McGarry and 
Schoeni, 1995, 1997).
5 Furthermore, the probability of making a transfer and the amount 
transferred are positively related to the donor’s income. These findings suggest that we would 
likely observe changes in the pattern of resource sharing in response to changes in the income of 
either party and to changes in the economic environment more generally.  
                                                 
3 Although we are equally interested in sharing among related and unrelated persons and will examine both in our 
empirical analysis, we follow the existing literature and couch our conceptual discussion in terms of sharing among 
extended family members. 
4 See Donald Cox (1987) for a clear description of these alternative models of altruism and exchange and a formal 
test of the validity of the altruism model. 
5 This result is consistent with an altruistic model wherein the donor is seeking to increase the consumption of a less 
well-off recipient but is also consistent with an exchange regime in which the transfer represents payment for a 
service, behavior, or previous assistance provided by the recipient.    p. 5 
When family or friends provide assistance in response to declines in the income of the 
recipient, they could be providing a form of insurance to each other, akin to that provided by 
formal private insurance markets or by publicly provided social insurance. This notion has been 
developed in several papers. For example, Kolikoff and Avia Spivak (1981) present a model in 
which families provide insurance (annuities) for their elderly members to protect against the 
possibility of “living too long” and exhausting their assets. Similarly Cox (1990) and Cox and 
Tullio Jappelli (1990) model the potential for familial transfers to alleviate liquidity constraints. 
Social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance, Social Security, and Workers’ 
Compensation can provide substantial protection against negative shocks to income (for 
example, Jonathan Gruber, 1997; Susan Dynarski and Gruber, 1997).  However, because these 
programs typically require some previous attachment to the labor force, many of the lowest 
income individuals may not qualify for benefits.  For this population, then, families could play a 
particularly important role.
 6 
2.2. Modes and magnitudes of resource sharing 
Although economists often focus on cash transfers, resource sharing can occur through other 
modes like the transfer of goods, time help, or a reduction in expenses through shared living 
arrangements.  The optimal choice of mode is determined by the characteristics of the donor and 
recipient, such as their financial resources, preferences, and the opportunity cost of their time.  
For example, a retired parent facing a low opportunity cost of her time may choose to assist her 
daughter by providing childcare to a grandchild, whereas a fully employed parent might choose 
to make cash transfers to pay for childcare. These sorts of trade-offs between time and financial 
                                                 
6 The notion of families or communities providing insurance against consumption shortfalls has been emphasized in 
the context of developing countries where formal insurance markets are less prevalent. Robert Townsend (1995) 
provides a good discussion of some of the relevant literature.    p. 6 
assistance have been documented in several empirical studies (Kenneth Couch et al., 1999).  
Despite the potential for transfers of various types to substitute for one another, research has 
tended to focus on each mode in isolation.
7  
Studies examining cash transfers have found that they are relatively common (Altonji, 
Hayashi, Kotlikoff, 1997, 2000; McGarry and Schoeni, 1995, 1997).  These studies estimate that 
approximately 20-30 percent of parents make inter vivos transfers to their adult children, with 
positive transfer amounts averaging from $2000- $3000 a year.  In addition, substantial amounts 
are transferred as bequests (for example, William Gale and John Karl Scholz, 1994). 
Ethnographic evidence also points to the importance of private transfers. In a compelling 
descriptive study of the resources of low-income households, Katherine Edin and Laura Lein 
(1997) report that approximately 80 percent of single mothers received transfers from private 
sources and these transfers accounted for 20 percent of household resources (pp. 150-151).  They 
also find that 25 percent report “doubling-up” with friends or relatives in order to reduce living 
expenses (pp. 54, 115).  However, because their data are not based on a randomly selected 
sample from a well-defined population, it is not possible to generalize their findings to a 
population beyond their respondents, nor do they analyze how resource sharing responds to 
changes in the economic and policy environment.   
Of the studies that have attempted to measure non-cash transfers, attention has been primarily 
limited to the transfer of time. These studies have found that the provision of home health care is 
the most common type of time transfer, with over one-third of such assistance flowing from adult 
children to their elderly parents (Department of Health and Human Services, 1998). McGarry 
and Schoeni (1995) find that, among individuals in their 50s who are providing care to elderly 
parents, the average amount is over 700 hours a year.  At a wage rate of $18 (MetLife, 2004), 
                                                 
7 Important exceptions to this practice are Mark Rosenzweig and Ken Wolpin (1993, 1994).   p. 7 
these services are comparable to cash transfers of at least $12,000 a year.  When help with tasks 
other than personal care items is included in the measure of time help, the fraction providing 
assistance rises substantially (Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff, 2000). The family also figures 
prominently in the care of children. In cases in which the mother is employed and not the 
primary caregiver, nearly 40 percent of the time the primary caregiver is a relative (David Blau 
and Janet Currie, 2004). 
Another potential mode of transfer is the provision of coresidence. This form of assistance is 
perhaps the most difficult to evaluate.  Not only is it difficult to measure accurately the multitude 
of direct subsidies that are provided through food, shelter, and time help, but monetary values 
must also be assigned to the returns to scale implicit in such arrangements
 and the potential costs 
associated with the loss of privacy.
8  Empirical analyses of shared living arrangements have 
again focused largely on the behavior of the elderly (Frances Korbin, 1976; Fred Pampel, 1983; 
Michael, et al., 1980), with some work examining the behavior of young adults (Leslie 
Whittington and Elizabeth Peters, 1996).   
In many data sets, including the one we use in our empirical analysis, income is collected for 
each household member but no information is collected on how income is shared.  Thomas 
Deleire and Ariel Kalil (2005) show that expenditures on child-specific consumption items differ 
markedly between cohabiting and married couples, with cohabitating couples spending less on 
children.  This finding suggests that income is not simply pooled at the household level, but 
rather that household structure matters.  Even more striking, a growing branch of the literature 
                                                 
8 Although we do not attempt to quantify them here, the returns to scale can be considerable. For example, in 
determining the appropriate poverty thresholds, the U.S. Census Bureau assumes that two individuals need only 28 
percent more income than a single individual to obtain the same standard of living. See Constance Citro and Robert 
Michael (1995) for a detailed discussion of the returns to scale in the poverty measure. These financial gains may be 
offset, at least in part, by the utility loss associated with less privacy.  Magnuson and Smeeding (2005) in a study of 
low-income new mothers, conclude, “In this case and others we encountered, the decision to live with relatives was 
determined more [by] necessity than by choice.” (p19).    p. 8 
has focused on income pooling among spouses.  Important early work by Duncan Thomas 
(1990) and Shelly Lundberg, et al. (1997) find that expenditure patterns differ significantly 
depending on which spouse controls the resources, with mothers devoting a larger share of 
spending to children.  Thus, not only is the assumption of equal sharing likely to be invalid in the 
case of coresidency, it is unlikely even to hold between spouses. These findings have important 
implications for our empirical analysis below. 
2.3. Resource sharing and the policy and economic environment 
As we have noted, decisions to share resources within and between households are likely to 
be influenced by the existing policy and economic environments.  In fact, the structure of many 
government assistance programs explicitly defines the economic unit in which resource sharing 
is expected to occur. As with much in our society, these assumptions have changed repeatedly 
over time, reflecting shifts in attitudes regarding public and private roles in meeting economic 
needs.  For example, the former state run Old Age Assistance (OAA) programs often included 
“relative responsibility” clauses that obligated children to provide financial support to their 
elderly parents (Elizabeth Epler, 1954).  Failure to support needy parents could result in court 
action and denial of public assistance to the parent.
 These requirements were abolished in 1974 
when the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) replaced OAA. Similarly, the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) initially targeted only unmarried mothers and their 
children; the presence of any adult male in the household to be sufficient grounds for the denial 
of benefits, presumably under the assumption that his resources were available to the children.  
Supreme Court decisions eventually invalidated this assumption (Patterson 2000, p. 173-4), and 
by the 1980s and 1990s, states generally ignored the resources of non-parents (Moffitt, et al.,   p. 9 
1998).
9  Under the TANF regulations applicable today, some states have returned to stricter 
requirements regarding the inclusion of resources from other household members, requiring, for 
example that a minor mother live with a parent or guardian and including a portion of that 
parent’s income when determining benefits.
10  
Even at a specified time, there is variation across assistance programs in the definition of the 
economic unit.  For example, the Food Stamp Program (FSP) has consistently used a broad 
definition, including all individuals in a household who purchase or prepare food together, 
regardless of their relationship (Steven Haider, et al., 2003).  In contrast, cash welfare assistance 
(TANF) generally only includes the income of a child’s parent and direct cash assistance from 
others when computing benefits.  
Several studies have examined the extent to which private cash transfers respond to public 
assistance programs.
11  In an early empirical study, Robert Lampman and Timothy Smeeding 
(1983) discuss the potential for government transfers to “crowd-out” or replace private cash 
assistance and provide suggestive evidence of such a trade-off.  More recent studies have 
confirmed the relationship, finding that private cash transfers decline in response to increased 
public assistance, although the overall responses are very small (Cox and George Jakubson 1995; 
Schoeni 1997; Schoeni 2002; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993, 1994).   
Similar analyses of the relationships between the policy and economic environments and the 
choice of living arrangements have been undertaken. With respect to the living arrangements of 
                                                 
9 States differed in their treatment of non-parental income.  In terms of benefit calculation, the Supreme Court 
decision barred the assumption that all income of the non-parent adult benefited the child.  However, some states 
inquired specifically about direct cash transfers to the child and included this amount in the benefit calculation. 
10 See Gretchen Rowe and Victoria Russell (2004) for a more complete description of TANF regulations across 
states. 
11 Theoretically, the specific relationship depends on the underlying motive for transfers. The predictions are the 
most clearly defined when altruism is the primary motivation. In this case as the income of a recipient rises, the 
marginal utility of a dollar transferred to her is reduced, and the marginal utilities of the donor and recipient 
(appropriately weighted) are equalized with fewer transfers. With an exchange motivation, the exact relationship 
depends on the relative elasticities for the supply and demand of the exchanged goods.      p. 10 
the elderly, several studies have concluded that the dramatic improvement in the financial 
situation of older persons evident over much of the last century has led to a sharp decline in the 
probability of coresidency (Michael, et al., 1980; Saul Schwartz, et al., 1984). Using expansions 
of Social Security, Old Age Assistance programs and SSI to identify the relationship between 
income and the living arrangements several studies have subsequently confirmed this 
relationship and in doing so have demonstrated the important interactions between public and 
private transfers (Dora Costa, 1999; McGarry and Schoeni, 2000; Gary Englehardt, et al., 2002).  
Studies of the living arrangement choices of younger populations have demonstrated that they 
too respond to the structure of cash assistance programs (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, 1994; 
Mariane Bitler, et al., 2004).   
In comparison to even this somewhat limited body of research assessing the interaction 
between public and private transfers, the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and 
private transfers has received relatively little attention.  Many of the general principles, though, 
should be the same. To the extent that an improving economy leads to an improvement in the 
economic status of recipients, we would expect fewer transfers.  However, because broad-based 
economic changes could affect the resources of the donor as well as the recipient, the supply and 
demand for transfers will change and the net effect may be ambiguous. 
3. Recent trends in incoming sharing 
The recent literature has tended to focus either on transfers from outside the household, 
referred to as inter-household transfers, or on income pooling within the household, referred to 
as intra-household transfers.  In our empirical work, we examine the relevance of both modes of 
resource sharing and focus on how these patterns have changed in response to changes in the 
macroeconomic environment.     p. 11 
3.1. Data and definitions 
Our data are drawn from the Current Population Surveys (CPS) for the years 1980 to 2004. 
We use the March supplements for each year, at which time information is obtained about 
income in the preceding year.  We will thus refer to our data as pertaining to the years 1979 
through 2003. The CPS provides detailed information on income components and household 
living arrangements for a large nationally representative sample. With these data we can identify 
both cash transfers from outside the household and the potential for income pooling within the 
household. A detailed household roster allows us to distinguish various types of living 
arrangements, including whether the other individuals in the household are relatives, non-
relatives, or, in the later years of our data, cohabiting partners.
12   
Our definitions of income sharing are straightforward. For inter-household income sharing, 
we us the CPS question that specifically asks about “regular financial assistance from friends or 
relatives not living in this household.”
  This question necessarily limits our focus to cash 
transfers, although in-kind transfers such as help with child care are likely to be important.  In 
addition, the phrase “regular financial assistance” presumably further limits the type of income 
transfers that will be reported.  Respondents must use their judgment regarding what qualifies as 
“regular”, and transfers that are made to offset a temporary income short-falls may be excluded.  
Such concerns are corroborated by past research that suggests the CPS-type question 
dramatically underestimates the amount of private transfers actually received.
13 
                                                 
12 Information about cohabitating partners is collected from 1994 through the end of our sample period.  Although 
nuclear family relationships are clearly delineated for everyone in the CPS, non-nuclear relatives and cohabiting 
partners are only identified for the household “reference person”, where the reference person is defined to be the 
person who “owns or rents” the unit (Current Population Survey, 2002).     
13 In 1988, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) included a question about private transfers that is fairly 
similar to the CPS question and an alternatively worded question that asks about transfers more fully.  McGarry and 
Schoeni (1995) show that the alternatively wording increased the prevalence of reported transfers from 4.9 to 20 
percent for the same respondents. This result suggests that inter-household transfers in the CPS may be substantially 
more common than our data indicate.   p. 12 
With regard to intra-household income sharing, the detailed information on the components 
of income contained in the CPS allows us to measure the income of various household members 
separately.  The ability to define the relationship between household members is central to our 
analysis, and the definitions we use are largely determined by the structure of the CPS.  We 
define the “nuclear family” as an individual or married couple along with any unmarried and 
childless children.
  This nuclear family is part of a potentially larger household, defined to be all 
individuals occupying an independent housing unit, such as a house or apartment.  Other 
household members are classified as relatives if they are related by blood or marriage to any 
member of the nuclear family; if not, other household members are as referred to as non-
relatives.  Based on these definitions, unmarried, cohabiting partners are not considered to be 
part of the same nuclear family, but rather in separate, unrelated families.   
There are three important considerations that should be noted when examining within 
household income sharing. First, we do not know the extent to which total household income is 
indeed shared by household members; we can therefore speak only to the potential for income 
sharing.  Second, along with the potential for pooling cash resources, these shared living 
arrangements will involve some degree of pooling of non-cash resources, such as time spent 
engaged in household chores or child care; these we are also unable to measure.  Third, there is 
an implicit gain in resources from the returns to scale in household production, such as the 
sharing of housing and utility costs and quantity discounts in food.  Although these factors are 
important to understanding the transfers imbedded in coresidency, they are largely ignored in our 
empirical analysis due to data constraints.    p. 13 
Our analysis is based on women ages 18 through 54.
14 For these individuals we examine the 
incomes of all members of their nuclear family and the incomes of others in the household; 
income accruing to these “other” household members is further broken down by relationship to 
our sample person (that from related persons, unrelated persons, and in the years for which it is 
possible, cohabiting partners).  Within these categories we classify income into four sources:  
earnings, means-tested public transfers, private financial transfers, and other income. In order to 
highlight the patterns of resource sharing for the low-income population, we divide our sample 
of individuals into three groups based on schooling level: less than high school, a high school 
degree, and schooling beyond high school. Our discussion focuses primarily on the less than high 
school group with the more schooled used for comparisons.  We apply sample weights 
throughout our analysis.
15  
3.2 Income sharing in 2003  
In the top panel of Table 1, we examine the sources of income for our sample of women.  
Unsurprisingly, we find extremely large differences in mean nuclear family income by schooling 
level, as well as differences in the components of income. Nuclear family income for low-
schooled women averages $35,248, while those in our highest education group report an average 
nuclear family income of $77,756.  In terms of the source of this income, labor earnings are a 
less important component for the less-skilled women than for the more-skilled women while 
income from means-tested transfer programs is obviously more important. The mean fraction of 
nuclear family income due to earnings is 78.6 percent for the less-educated women, compared to 
                                                 
14 The patterns we report here for women are fairly similar to those observed for men.  Due to space constraints we 
do not report the results for men.  
15 We make two adjustments to these income data.  First, we recode negative earnings and negative income to be 
zero, viewing a loss in these dimensions as a reduction in wealth.  Second, we drop from the analysis all households 
that report zero total income. The results are not sensitive to these decisions. 
   p. 14 
85.1 percent for women with a high school diploma and 87.4 percent for women with more than 
a high school education.  In contrast, means-tested transfers account for 8.2, 3.0 and 1.0 percent 
of income, respectively.  
From the results in the table, private financial transfers are fairly unimportant, comprising on 
average less than 1 percent of nuclear family income for all educational groups.  However, as 
discussed in Section 3.1, previous studies have concluded that CPS-type questions dramatically 
underestimate the amount of private transfers actually received. Although we cannot demonstrate 
it with these data, we expect that private transfers are substantially more important than they 
appear to be based on this evidence. 
The top panel of Table 1 also presents information on the source of total household income 
for women in our sample. Unsurprisingly, total household income increases with schooling level 
ranging from $42,089 for the least-educated group to $83,900 for the most-educated group.  
However, the fraction of total income attributable to household members outside of the nuclear 
family is much more important for the less schooled group. For example, among women without 
a high school diploma, 85 percent of household income accrues to the nuclear family, 6 percent 
to related household members, and 5 percent to both cohabiting partners and unrelated 
individuals.  For women with more than a high school diploma, the figures are 92 percent to the 
nuclear family, 2 percent to related household members, and 3 percent to both cohabitors and 
unrelated individuals.  These results suggest that the least-educated women could be relying 
more on resources stemming from shared living arrangements than are women with more 
education.  Moreover, among the least-educated, transfers arising from shared residence are 
potentially much more important than transfers from outside the household.  Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1994) draw a similar conclusion using NLSY data.   p. 15 
Although our focus is on all women, we present a similar set of tabulations for single women 
with a child under eighteen years old in her nuclear family in the lower panel of Table 1.  The 
same general patterns emerge:  nuclear family income and household income increases with 
education, the relative importance of different income sources are comparable, and the scope for 
resource sharing from within the household appears to be much greater than the measured private 
financial transfers reported by a nuclear family.  Perhaps the most notable difference between the 
two panels is that, for less-educated single mothers, the role of related family income in the 
household is greater than for the general population of less-educated women.  For example, 
related family income comprises 6 percent of household income for all less-educated women, but 
13 percent of household income for less-educated single mothers.  However, given the similarity 
in overall patterns, we focus the rest of our analysis on all women. 
In Table 2 we focus in more detail on the importance of resource sharing by examining the 
distributions of these private financial transfers and non-nuclear family income more generally. 
The table also highlights some of the more interesting differences in demographic characteristics 
for the recipients and non-recipients of each form of transfer (or potential transfer). Despite the 
probable under-reporting of the receipt of private cash transfers, columns 1 through 3 
demonstrate that when the private transfers are reported, the amounts are large. The mean 
amount of private transfers for the least schooled is $6,574 and one-quarter of the recipients 
reported transfers over $7,900. Because the mean nuclear family income among women in the 
lowest education group is just $24,683, the average cash transfer was nearly one-third of average 
income. Average transfer amounts are similarly large for the other education groups, with the 
women in the high school diploma group receiving an average of $5,182 and women with more 
than a high school diploma receiving $7,621. However, because nuclear family income is   p. 16 
substantially higher for these more highly educated women, cash transfers are less important 
relative to total income. 
In comparing those who receive cash transfers with those who do not among the least-
educated  women, transfer recipients have lower nuclear family incomes on average than non-
recipients and are less likely to be married, have children, or to be in school.  The patterns are 
similar for the two other educational groups, with the notable exception of the relationship 
between transfer receipt and school attendance.  In each of the more highly educated groups, 
transfer recipients are substantially more likely to be attending school than their non-transfer 
counterparts.  This difference in school enrollment suggests that the transfers reported in the CPS 
for those with a high school diploma could represent familial financial assistance in financing a 
college education. 
In columns 4 through 6 of Table 2, we similarly examine non-nuclear family income.  The 
probability of having non-nuclear family income is much higher than that for private financial 
transfers, ranging from 24 percent for women in the lowest educational group to 15 percent for 
women in the highest educational group.  Moreover, conditional on having some non-nuclear 
family income, the amount of such income is actually larger than mean nuclear family income, a 
result holds for all educational groups.  The existence of non-nuclear family income is 
concentrated among those who are relatively young, less likely to be married, and less likely to 
have children.  Overall, the recipient/non-recipient comparisons for non-nuclear family income 
are similar to those for private financial transfers, consistent with the notion that private financial 
transfers and coresidency are different modes of the same economic process of income sharing.     p. 17 
3.3. Trends in income sharing 
In Figure 1, we show the trends from 1979 to 2003 in the importance of various components 
of household income for each of our schooling categories. The height of each line depicts the 
sample average of the fraction of total household income coming from each of three underlying 
components: nuclear family income, related family income, and unrelated/cohabiting family 
income.  The first panel demonstrates a clear decline over time in the relative importance of 
nuclear family income. This decline is particularly dramatic for the less educated women, falling 
from approximately 94 percent of total household income in 1979 to 85 percent in 2003. As the 
next two panels demonstrate, this decline was offset by an increase in the fraction of income 
coming from unrelated/cohabiting individuals (a 7 percentage point increase) and a somewhat 
smaller increase in the fraction of household income from related family members (a 4 
percentage point increase). 
There are two potential sources for the substantial decline in the fraction of total income 
attributable to individuals in the nuclear family:  changes in the composition of household living 
arrangements or changes in the importance of nuclear family income within living arrangement 
type.  As an example of the first source, suppose disadvantaged women begin to coreside with 
other individuals (who are not their spouses).  To the extent that these other individuals have 
income, then these women will experience a decline in the amount of total income attributable to 
the nuclear family.  Alternatively, even for households for which the composition remains 
unchanged, the income received by the members of the nuclear family could decline relative to 
that received by other household members.   
In figure 2 we decompose the total change in the fraction of household income coming from 
the nuclear family into the portion attributable to each of these sources and we do so separately   p. 18 
for each of our three schooling groups.
16  We consider four mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
living arrangement groups:  (1) married women, (2) unmarried women who live with only 
nuclear family members, (3) unmarried women who live with at least some related family 
members but not any unrelated individuals, and (4) unmarried women who live with any 
unrelated individuals, regardless of whether there are other relatives in the household. The top 
panel presents the results for the years 1979-2003. The first bar in each set shows the total 
decline and the next two bars illustrate the portion due to a change in living arrangements and the 
portion due to a change in income shares within living arrangement.  The height of each bar 
depicts the percent decline. For those in the less than high school category, the total change in 
the fraction of household income attributable to nuclear family income is a reduction of 9.5 
percentage points.  Of this decline, about three-quarters (-7.0 / -9.5) is attributable to changes in 
living arrangements and the remaining one-quarter is attributable to changes in income fractions 
within living arrangement types.  For the more schooled groups, the decline in nuclear family 
income is less (6.9 percentage points for women with a high school diploma and 2.8 percentage 
points for women with more than a high school diploma), but the relative importance of the two 
sources of change are similar. 
                                                 
16 The decomposition is implemented as follows:  Let  t q be the population ratio of nuclear family income to 
household income at time t. Let 
j
t q  be the equivalent ratio for each subgroup j at time t, and let  
j
t p  be the 
proportion of the population in each subgroup.  For the simple case with just two subgroups, a and b,  t q can be 
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where the first two terms reflect the effect of shifts in the proportion of the population in groups a and b, holding 
relative income constant at the initial period (s) level, and the second two terms reflect the change due to changes in 
the relative importance of nuclear family income, holding the proportion of the population in each group constant at 
the final period (t) level.   p. 19 
Using this decomposition technique, we can also examine which types of living 
arrangements rose in prominence and which declined. (This decomposition is illustrated in 
appendix table A1).  We find that the 75 percent of the decline in the importance of nuclear 
family income that was due to changing living arrangements arose primarily to a reduction in the 
proportion of women living in the married household and an increase in the proportion in each of 
our three unmarried groups. Among these unmarried groups, the increase in women living with 
unrelated individuals (possibly cohabiting partners) was twice as important as the increases in 
the two other unmarried groups.   
These results demonstrate an important increase in the number of women living with 
unrelated individuals.  One potential explanation for this increase is a movement from marriage 
to cohabitation because, as we noted earlier, spouses are defined to be part of the same nuclear 
family while cohabiting partners are not. Such a movement would thus shift income from the 
nuclear family to an unrelated family member.  To examine this possibility, we repeat our 
analysis for the period 1994-2003, the years in which the CPS distinguishes between cohabiting 
partners from other unrelated individuals.  These results are presented in the lower panel of 
Figure 2. The overall change in the importance of nuclear family income for the least schooled 
category over this shorter time period is a decline of 2.4 percent, somewhat smaller than would 
be expected if the change over the longer time period were distributed evenly. Furthermore, the 
source of the change is divided about equally between changes in living arrangements and 
changes in the distribution of income within household types (-1.1 and -1.2 percent). When we 
once again disaggregate these results further to examine the role of specific types of living 
arrangements (not shown), we find that all of the decline due to changing living arrangements is 
attributable to increased cohabitation.   p. 20 
We now turn to a detailed examination of the components of nuclear family income.  We 
examine four nuclear family income sources: (1) earnings, (2) means tested transfers, (3) private 
financial transfers (including child support, and alimony), and (4) other income (e.g., asset 
income, retirement benefits, workers’ compensation, and unemployment insurance). Figure 3 
graphs the respective fractions of household income due to these components over our sample 
period. 
For women in the lowest educational category, there was a fairly consistent decline in the 
importance of earnings throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. However, beginning in 1994, there 
was a sharp reversal of this trend with the portion of family income coming from earnings 
increasing substantially. This reversal is likely related to the strong economic growth during this 
period and changes in welfare policy (Schoeni and Blank, 2000; Jacob Klerman and Haider, 
2004).  The pattern for means-tested public transfers mirrors that for earnings, increasing during 
the 1980s and early 1990s and then falling dramatically. 
Although it is difficult to discern in the figure, there is a notable increase in income coming 
from private financial transfers, child support or alimony, particularly towards the end of this 
period.
17 The change is small in an absolute sense, increasing from 2 to 3 percentage points of 
family income, but large in percentage terms, increasing by 50 percent.  This trend towards 
private transfers could be a response to the decline in public support, as well as to the increased 
efforts to establish paternity and collect child support (Cancian and Meyer, 2005).  Also of 
interest is the relatively high and consistent level of related family income, remaining fixed at 
approximately 10 percent throughout the period for the least-educated women. 
                                                 
17 We combine these sources because they are not separately identified until 1987.      p. 21 
3.4. Assessing macroeconomic effects 
In order to assess the relationship between the economy and the relative importance of the 
various sources of income net of other household characteristics, we turn to a regression analysis.  
For this exercise we divide household income into six categories, four of which pertain to the 
income of the nuclear family (earnings, means-tested public transfers, private transfers, and other 
income) and two of which pertain to income accruing to non-nuclear members (related family 
income and unrelated/cohabiting  income).  We then construct six different dependent variables 
Yit to be the percent of total household income due to each of these sources and regress these 
dependent variables on a measure of macroeconomic performance and other standard controls.
18  
Specifically, we estimate the regression equation 
(1)   it t s it it it X U Y e g a b b b + + + + + = 2 1 0 . 
We use annual state unemployment rates Uit as our proxy for the macroeconomic conditions. As 
other controls Xit, we include our three schooling levels, race/ethnicity, age, marital status, 
whether the woman is enrolled in school, and the presence of children in the nuclear family.  
State fixed effects  s a  are included to control for persistent differences across states in policies 
and the economic environment.  We use year fixed effects  t g  to capture other nationwide 
changes over time, such as changes in public assistance programs, the EITC, and social norms.  
We use data from 1987 through 2003 yielding approximately three-quarters of a million 
observations.  We present only the results for our key coefficient Uit in Table 3; appendix table 
A2 provides complete regression results.  
Unsurprisingly, we find that higher unemployment rates are associated with a reduced 
percentage of household income due to nuclear family earnings and an increased fraction of 
                                                 
18 Because the dependent variables sum to 100 across income sources for each individual, the coefficients on any 
particular regressor must sum to zero across income sources.  The individual coefficients should be interpreted as 
the relative cyclicality of each of the underlying sources.    p. 22 
means-tested public transfers.  These effects, although statistically strong, are not economically 
large. An increase in the unemployment rate of 1 percentage point is associated with a decline of 
0.5 percentage points in the fraction of income coming from labor earnings of nuclear family 
members. This is equivalent to a decline of just 0.6 percent (0.522 / 77.99). The increase in the 
probability of means tested transfers associated with a 1 percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate is even smaller in percentage point terms (0.2), but because such transfers are 
less common than labor earnings, the percentage effects are large, corresponding to a 5.8 percent 
increase in the fraction of income due to means-tested public transfers (0.186 / 3.22).  Private 
transfers also increase significantly with the unemployment rate by a similar 5.7 percent (an 
increase of 0.024 percentage points).  Thus, even though private transfers are relatively rare, they 
potentially play an important role in smoothing the consumption of low income families over the 
business cycle.  However, we find no significant relationship between the unemployment rate 
and the income from either category of non-nuclear family members.  
Our regression methodology also allows us examine yearly trends in the importance of 
income sources, net of the business cycle and other factors that are controlled for in the 
regressions.  These trends are simply the coefficients on the dummy variables denoting each year 
of our sample. In Figure 4 we plot the values of these coefficients for each of the six regressions.  
Many of the same patterns we have already identified are apparent.  Perhaps most importantly, 
there is a strong secular increase in earnings from unrelated and cohabiting individuals, reaching 
almost 3 percentage points by the end of our sample period.  There is also a steady increase in 
the fraction of household income due to related family members.  Finally, the decline and then 
increase in the importance of nuclear family earnings, with an opposite pattern for means-tested 
transfers, is also apparent in these estimated effects.   p. 23 
3.5 Poverty rates and income sharing 
The results presented thus far indicate that private cash transfers and transfers through shared  
living arrangements can be important sources of support for the low-income population.  In this 
section we address the potential for these transfers to mitigate economic hardship. To do so, we 
examine the effect of various transfers and income pooling arrangements on poverty rates.  The 
basis for our analysis is the official poverty measure defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, but we 
explore alternative definitions of income and the relevant economic unit.
19 
In Table 5 we tabulate the poverty rate for seven different definitions of the appropriate 
economic unit and income measure.  In the first row of table 5, the economic unit is defined to be 
the nuclear family and income to be total nuclear family income, exclusive of all means-tested 
transfers and all private cash transfers.  For the lowest schooled in our sample, the poverty rate 
based on this definition is 35.6 percent.  The next row adds public transfers to the definition of 
income but continues to exclude private cash transfers. The poverty rate for the least-educated 
group falls to 33.9 percent.  Adding private transfers as well (row 3) has little effect on poverty, 
reducing the rate to 33.8 percent.  In the next row we expand the economic unit to include all 
related family members in the household and increase income and the needs standard 
accordingly. This poverty measure, which corresponds to the official Census definition, is 31.4 
percent. This decline in the poverty rate indicates that related persons bring more than enough 
income to the household to cover their needs (as defined by the increment in the poverty 
threshold).  
                                                 
19 The Census definition of poverty is based on a comparison of the income of the economic unit (defined as all 
related members of a household) to an income threshold specific to the size of the unit. This measure provides a 
convenient metric for judging well-being that is widely cited and easily calculated for varying sized economic units 
and income measures. However, it is not without its critics. See Citro and Michael (1995) for a discussion of its 
weakness and some suggested modifications.   p. 24 
In row 5, we define the economic unit to be the nuclear family with just cohabiting partners.  
It might be that such an economic unit better corresponds to actual income pooling arrangements 
than does the official poverty measure.  Although the poverty rate falls substantially compared to 
the poverty rate based on the nuclear family alone, it is quite similar to that calculated for the 
related family in row 4 (the official poverty measure).  When we further expand the economic 
unit to include both related family members and cohabiting partners (row 6), the poverty rate 
declines even further to 28.6 percent.  The final row (row 7) incorporates all persons in the 
household and the poverty rate drops to 26.4 percent for the least schooled and 5.9 percent for 
those with the most schooling. Thus, the “choice” to live with others has the potential to improve 
economic well-being substantially. In total, the poverty rate declines by over 20 percent when the 
relevant unit is expanded from the nuclear family with all public and private transfers included in 
income (row 3) to the extended household.   
We note, however, that these broader definitions assume that household income is shared the 
same way among members of the economic unit, regardless of their relationships.  Such an 
assumption is almost certainly not true.  
4. Conclusions and discussion 
Individuals have many dimensions over which they can adjust their behavior in response to 
economic change. They may increase or decrease employment levels, retrain for a new job, alter 
their reliance on public assistance programs, or give or receive private support from family and 
friends. Despite the central role the family plays in current policy discussions, surprisingly little 
research has examined the role of the family in providing protection against negative economic 
shocks.  To begin to fill this void, we provide a synthesis of several related literatures on private   p. 25 
transfers and then present new empirical evidence regarding the importance of these transfers 
and how they vary with the economic and policy environments.  
The theoretical literature contains several well-developed models of resource sharing 
between and within households that provide important insights into possible motives.  Moreover, 
the existing empirical literature demonstrates clearly that individuals make substantial transfers 
and numerous modes of resource sharing are employed.  Furthermore, recent work suggests that 
the probability and amount of cash transfers depend on the resources of both the potential donors 
and recipients and on the availability of public assistance programs.  However, few studies have 
examined simultaneously multiple modes of assistance, how transfers vary over time, or how 
transfers respond to the economic environment more generally.  Our empirical work begins to 
fill these gaps.  
We find that transfers provide an important source of support for low-income individuals, 
with coresidency being particularly important.  In addition, our results indicate that, while 
transfers respond significantly to macroeconomic conditions, there has also been a steady 
increase in shared living arrangements that is unexplained by macroeconomic and demographic 
changes. We hypothesize that these changes may be due to changes in attitudes and social norms. 
As in past studies, our investigation of cash transfers is limited by the data. Inter-household 
cash transfers appear to be poorly measured in the CPS and it is thus impossible to assess 
accurately their true significance. However, we do find that when such transfers are reported, the 
amounts are large relative to the non-transfer incomes of the recipients. More recent surveys, 
such as the Health and Retirement Study, employ more detailed questions on transfers than have 
been asked in the past and will provide the opportunity to re-examine this issue in the future.  We 
note also that the phenomenon of income sharing within households is also poorly understood.   p. 26 
Although economists have developed elegant household bargaining models that predict that the 
income of household members is unlikely to be pooled completely, an understanding of exactly 
how such income is shared awaits additional empirical analyses. We do, however, emphasize 
that the potential for improvement in financial status from income pooling is large.    
Finally, one of the more important avenues for additional research is an examination of the 
choice of living arrangements. Decisions about coresidence depend on the living arrangement 
options available to an individual, the availability of other forms of public and private support, 
household production processes, and the relative value of privacy.  Because of the degree of 
complication involved in the decision making process, a rigorous investigation of co-residency 
requires sophisticated modeling and extremely detailed data. Although difficult, an 
understanding of the decision to live with others and the transfers embedded in such 
arrangements are crucial for an understanding of the resources available to the low income 
population. 
Despite the limitations of our study, our results suggest at least two important lessons for 
public policy.  First, when interpreting the effects of economic or policy changes, the potential 
for changes in private support must be considered.  For example, studies which find only small 
effects of welfare reform on income may miss the importance of income provided by family and 
friends and thus the burdens imposed on non-welfare recipients.  Second, the functioning of  
public assistance programs and poverty measurement depend critically on the definition of the 
economic unit.  Any definition makes implicit assumptions about how resources are shared 
among family and household members, yet there exists relatively little empirical evidence to 
justify the choice of one definition over the other. This again highlights the importance of a   p. 27 
additional research on private transfers and the responsiveness of these transfers to changes in 
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 Table 1: Income by Source, Family Unit, and Education, 2003 
       
  Less HS  HS  More HS 
All women       
Observations  7,007  16,926  32,821 
       
Mean nuclear family income   35,248    51,034    77,756  
Percent of nuclear family income by source
 §       
   Earnings   78.6    85.1    87.4  
   Private financial transfers   0.5    0.5    0.9  
   Means-tested transfers
†    8.2    3.0    1.0  
   Other
‡   12.7    11.4    10.7  
       
Mean household income   42,089    57,906    83,900  
Percent of household income by source
        
   Nuclear family income   84.6    89.0    92.1  
   Related family income   5.8    3.6    1.8  
   Cohabiting family income
    4.9    4.3    2.7  
   Non-related family income   4.6    3.1    3.3  
       
Single mothers       
Observations  1,034  1,976  2,981 
       
Mean nuclear family income  31,568  32,339  54,126 
Percent of nuclear family income by source
 §       
   Earnings  73.1  79.0  80.4 
   Private financial transfers  0.3  0.7  0.4 
   Means-tested transfers
†   11.7  6.0  2.5 
   Other
‡  15.0  14.3  16.6 
       
Mean household income  41,145  46,179  64,974 
Percent of household income by source       
   Nuclear family income  77.2  76.8  85.3 
   Related family income  13.0  12.7  9.0 
   Cohabiting family income
   6.4  7.4  3.8 
   Non-related family income  3.3  3.1  1.9 
§ These tabulations are the mean across families of the fraction of income by source; nuclear 
families with zero total income are excluded.
  
† Means-tested transfers include income from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.  
‡ Other income includes transfers from the unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and 
workers’ compensation programs, alimony and child support, asset income, retirement benefits, 
and other miscellaneous income. 
   p. 33 
Table 2: Transfers by Source and Education, 2003 
               
  Private financial transfers    Non-nuclear family income 












Proportion receiving any  0.011  0.013  0.022    0.236  0.190  0.146 
           
Amount of transfers among recipients         
  Observations  64  196  583    1,643  3,224  4,425 
  25
th percentile  960  900  2,000    12,156  14,400  16,014 
  Median  2,000  2,000  4,500    21,800  26,000  30,200 
  75
th percentile  7,920  5,000  9,000    37,400  45,676  51,696 
  Mean  6,574  5,182  7,621    28,987  36,258  42,116 
  Standard error of mean  1,388  685  409    707  779  692 
               
Characteristics of recipients           
  Observations  64  196  583    1,643  3,224  4,425 
  Nuclear family income  24,683  26,072  31,318    17,169  26,619  37,105 
  Household income  26,615  30,285  41,542    46,156  62,877  79,221 
  Age  34.5  31.3  28.9    31.9  33.3  32.2 
  Proportion married  0.200  0.266  0.212    0.232  0.193  0.139 
  Proportion with children  0.493  0.460  0.280    0.486  0.420  0.284 
  Proportion in school  0.105  0.126  0.379    0.095  0.047  0.173 
               
Characteristics of non-recipients             
  Observations  6,943  16,730  32,238    5,364  13,702  28,396 
  Nuclear family income  35,362  51,369  78,817    40,833  56,743  84,699 
  Household income  42,257  58,277  84,868    40,833  56,743  84,699 
  Age  33.8  37.1  36.8    34.3  37.9  37.4 
  Proportion married  0.472  0.571  0.580    0.542  0.654  0.646 
  Proportion with children  0.624  0.539  0.508    0.664  0.566  0.541 
  Proportion in school  0.126  0.039  0.094    0.135  0.038  0.087 
   p. 34 
Table 3: OLS Model for Fraction of Household Income by Source   
             
   

















             
Unemployment rate  -0.522  0.024  0.186  0.320  0.009  -0.017 
  (0.044)**  (0.008)**  (0.022)**  (0.030)**  (0.020)  (0.027) 
             
Mean of the dep var  77.99  0.42  3.22  9.59  2.77  6.01 
R-squared  0.200  0.010  0.110  0.040  0.040  0.160 
The estimates for these tables are based on equation 1 from the text.  The regressions are based 





   p. 35 
Table 4: Percent Poor by Alternative Definitions of  Economic Unit and Income, 2003 
       
  Less HS  HS  More HS 
       
(1) Nuclear family, excluding public & private transfers  35.6  16.6  8.7 
(2) Nuclear family, excluding private transfers  33.9  15.7  8.4 
(3) Nuclear family  33.8  15.6  7.8 
(4) Nuclear + related family (official rate)  31.4  14.1  7.1 
(5) Nuclear + cohabitor family  31.0  13.8  7.0 
(6) Nuclear + related + cohabitor family  28.6  12.4  6.3 
(7) Entire household  26.4  11.3  5.4 
       
 
 
   p. 36 
Figure 1: Components of Total Household Income 
 





























































































































































   p. 37 
Figure 2:  Decomposition of Decline in Nuclear Family Income 
 













































Total Change Change Due to Living Arrange. Change Due to Income Shares
 
 











































Total Change Change Due to Living Arrange. Change Due to Income Shares
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More HS  p. 40 


































The estimates for these figures are based on equation 1 from the text. 
  
   p. 41 
 Appendix 
 
 Table A1: Decomposing Change in Nuclear Family Income Shares 
       
  Less HS  HS  More HS 
1979-2003 Change       
       
Total change in nuclear family income share  -9.49  -6.93  -2.80 
   Change due to changing living arrangements  -7.06  -5.70  -2.33 
   Change due to changing income shares  -2.43  -1.23  -0.46 
       
Changes in  living arrangements by household  type  -7.06  -5.70  -2.33 
    married     -13.15  -11.02  -3.60 
    unmarried, nuclear family only  1.20  0.63  -0.85 
    unmarried, related and nuclear family only  1.49  1.42  0.83 
    unmarried, any unrelated family   3.39  3.28  1.28 
       
Changes in income shares by household  type  -2.43  -1.23  -0.46 
    married     -1.47  -0.89  -0.36 
    unmarried, nuclear family only  0.00  0.00  0.00 
    unmarried, related and nuclear family only  -0.27  -0.22  -0.11 
    unmarried, any unrelated family   -0.68  -0.12  0.01 
       
1994-2003 Change       
       
Total change in nuclear family income share   -2.35  -1.64  -1.06 
   Change due to changing living arrangements  -1.15  -1.37  -0.91 
   Change due to changing income shares  -1.21  -0.28  -0.15 
       
Changes in living arrangements by household type   -1.15  -1.37  -0.91 
    married     -1.14  -4.41  -2.02 
    unmarried, nuclear family only  -0.65  1.98  0.30 
    unmarried, related and nuclear family only  -0.42  0.12  0.09 
    unmarried, unrelated family with cohabitor   1.31  1.14  0.85 
    unmarried, unrelated family, no cohabitor  -0.24  -0.19  -0.13 
       
Changes in income shares by household type  -1.21  -0.28  -0.15 
    married     -0.23  -0.31  0.00 
    unmarried, nuclear family only  0.00  0.00  0.00 
    unmarried, related and nuclear family only  -0.36  0.17  -0.03 
    unmarried, unrelated family, with cohabitor   -0.27  -0.10  0.00 
    unmarried, unrelated family, no cohabitor  -0.35  -0.04  -0.12 
   p. 42 
Table A2: OLS Model for Fraction of Household Income by Source 
   
             
   

















Unemployment rate  -0.522  0.024  0.186  0.320  0.009  -0.017 
  (0.044)**  (0.008)**  (0.022)**  (0.030)**  (0.020)  (0.027) 
Less than HS  -15.427  -0.141  8.675  2.037  3.026  1.830 
  (0.106)**  (0.018)**  (0.053)**  (0.071)**  (0.049)**  (0.066)** 
HS degree  -4.241  -0.113  1.688  0.299  1.434  0.933 
  (0.075)**  (0.013)**  (0.037)**  (0.050)**  (0.035)**  (0.046)** 
Age  -0.035  -0.006  0.023  0.365  -0.091  -0.256 
  (0.004)**  (0.001)**  (0.002)**  (0.003)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
Enrolled in school  7.277  0.777  -3.768  5.929  -1.574  -8.641 
  (0.144)**  (0.025)**  (0.072)**  (0.096)**  (0.067)**  (0.089)** 
Child present  1.002  -0.226  3.346  -0.416  2.262  -5.968 
  (0.071)**  (0.012)**  (0.036)**  (0.048)**  (0.033)**  (0.044)** 
Married  26.019  -0.395  -5.616  -5.412  -2.688  -11.908 
  (0.077)**  (0.013)**  (0.038)**  (0.051)**  (0.036)**  (0.048)** 
Black  -3.139  -0.016  5.290  -0.395  2.417  -4.158 
  (0.107)**  (0.018)  (0.054)**  (0.072)**  (0.050)**  (0.067)** 
Hispanic  -0.513  -0.006  0.923  -1.797  1.931  -0.539 
  (0.117)**  (0.020)  (0.059)**  (0.078)**  (0.054)**  (0.073)** 
Other  -3.509  0.830  1.401  -0.137  1.856  -0.441 
  (0.165)**  (0.028)**  (0.083)**  (0.110)  (0.076)**  (0.103)** 
Year-1988  -0.447  0.123  0.080  0.040  -0.070  0.273 
  (0.204)*  (0.035)**  (0.102)  (0.137)  (0.095)  (0.127)* 
Year-1989  -0.747  0.031  -0.091  0.190  0.049  0.567 
  (0.206)**  (0.035)  (0.103)  (0.138)  (0.095)  (0.128)** 
Year-1990  -1.085  0.103  0.207  -0.063  0.253  0.585 
  (0.203)**  (0.035)**  (0.102)*  (0.136)  (0.094)**  (0.126)** 
Year-1991  -1.170  0.054  0.318  -0.344  0.275  0.868 
  (0.202)**  (0.035)  (0.101)**  (0.135)*  (0.094)**  (0.126)** 
Year-1992  -1.557  0.028  0.338  -0.287  0.398  1.079 
  (0.208)**  (0.036)  (0.104)**  (0.139)*  (0.097)**  (0.130)** 
Year-1993  -2.799  0.108  0.725  0.058  0.485  1.423 
  (0.202)**  (0.035)**  (0.101)**  (0.135)  (0.094)**  (0.126)** 
Year-1994  -2.296  0.105  0.481  -0.081  0.538  1.253 
  (0.199)**  (0.034)**  (0.100)**  (0.133)  (0.092)**  (0.124)** 
Year-1995  -2.064  0.048  0.168  -0.358  0.685  1.522 
  (0.200)**  (0.034)  (0.100)  (0.134)**  (0.093)**  (0.125)** 
Year-1996  -2.239  0.052  0.002  -0.130  0.568  1.746 
  (0.201)**  (0.035)  (0.101)  (0.135)  (0.093)**  (0.125)** 
Year-1997  -2.371  0.059  -0.323  0.152  0.447  2.035   p. 43 
  (0.206)**  (0.035)  (0.103)**  (0.138)  (0.095)**  (0.128)** 
Year-1998  -1.521  0.107  -0.769  0.100  0.386  1.696 
  (0.211)**  (0.036)**  (0.106)**  (0.141)  (0.098)**  (0.131)** 
Year-1999  -1.801  0.054  -1.116  0.004  0.563  2.297 
  (0.216)**  (0.037)  (0.108)**  (0.144)  (0.100)**  (0.134)** 
Year-2000  -1.452  0.065  -1.271  -0.261  0.582  2.336 
  (0.220)**  (0.038)  (0.110)**  (0.147)  (0.102)**  (0.137)** 
Year-2001  -1.011  0.117  -1.478  -0.304  0.394  2.282 
  (0.207)**  (0.036)**  (0.104)**  (0.138)*  (0.096)**  (0.129)** 
Year-2002  -0.833  0.134  -1.661  -0.647  0.482  2.525 
  (0.197)**  (0.034)**  (0.099)**  (0.132)**  (0.091)**  (0.123)** 
Year-2003  -1.174  0.145  -1.465  -0.528  0.566  2.457 
  (0.196)**  (0.034)**  (0.098)**  (0.131)**  (0.091)**  (0.122)** 
Mean of the dep var  77.99  0.42  3.22  9.59  2.77  6.01 
Observations  736,024  736,024  736,024  736,024  736,024  736,024 
R-squared  0.200  0.010  0.110  0.040  0.040  0.160 
 
 
 